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Abstract
We study tax evasion and decentralized tax enforcement in a federal economy with mo-
bile capital and the endogenous formation of multiregional companies. Regions use their
enforcement policy as a strategic instrument to engage in ¯scal competition. Within this
framework, we analyze the uncoordinated policy choice under formula apportionment (FA)
and compare it to the incentives which derive from ¯scal equalization (FE). As both systems
redistribute collected revenues but not enforcement costs, they distort the regions' incentives
to enforce taxes. At the same time, jurisdictions partially internalize the ¯scal externalities
caused by their enforcement policy. We show that the tradeo® between these two opposing
e®ects di®ers between FA and FE, and crucially depends on the degree of interregional ¯rm
integration under FA. We discuss conditions under which FA, FE or a joint system of FA
cum FE provides the `best' incentives for decentralized tax enforcement.
Keywords: Tax Enforcement; Tax Evasion; Formula Apportionment; Fiscal Equalization;
Tax Revenue Sharing.
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Over the last decades, a vast body of research has studied taxation within a federal system
of governments (Oates, 1999). Thereby, surprisingly few contributions tackle an important
practical aspect: the role of tax enforcement in a federal economy. Given the signi¯cant amount
of taxes evaded and the equally impressive amount of resources spent on enforcing tax payments,1
this issue deserves more attention.
Apart from the highly decentralized system in Germany, where tax enforcement is under
the sole responsibility of the LÄ ander, many countries employ elements of de facto decentralized
enforcement. This is the case for e.g. Canada, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, the UK as well as sev-
eral developing and transitional economies, including China and Russia.2 Despite its widespread
application, there are only few studies of decentralized enforcement. Cremer and Gahvari (2000)
as well as StÄ owhase and Traxler (2005) consider decentralized enforcement of taxes, taking into
account evasion as well as an interregionally mobile tax base. Stricter enforcement then raises
the e®ective taxation in a region, resulting in an out°ow of the tax base, which corresponds
to a positive externality. As long as the decentralized policy ignores this ¯scal externality,
enforcement measures will be ine±ciently weak.
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence of cases where regions indeed seem to employ `mild' en-
forcement as a strategic tool to attract a mobile tax base. In China there have been recent claims
that `[s]ome regional governments openly abandoned law enforcement [...] to lure investors'.3
Similar reports come e.g. from Belgium (compare Cremer and Gahvari, 2000), Germany (see
e.g. Senator fur Finanzen, 2005) and Russia (Libman and Feld, 2007).
Given that several countries may face institutional and political-economic constraints which
render a (full) centralization of tax enforcement infeasible,4 it is important to ask, which policies
can be used to improve the e®ectiveness of decentralized tax enforcement. A promising approach
derives from the tax competition literature: as pointed out by Wildasin (1989), a system of
Pigouvian subsidies can be used to internalize ¯scal externalities from decentralized taxation.
In practice, ¯scal equalization (FE) schemes may ful¯ll this role (Smart, 1998; KÄ othenbÄ urger,
2002). StÄ owhase and Traxler (2005) show that FE makes regions internalize the externalities
associated with tax enforcement. In addition, however, a FE system will typically cause an
additional distortion: as long as only tax revenues are redistributed but enforcement costs are
1For the US, Slemrod (2007) estimates a tax gap of approximately $350 billion in the year 2001 (more than
15 percent of the estimated actual tax liability). The annual budget of the Internal Revenue Service amounts to
roughly $10 billion (Sawicky, 2005).
2Mikesell (2003) and Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2005) o®er a comprehensive discussion of the di®erent
institutional arrangements.
3China Daily, July 23, 2007, p.4. Compare also Knight and Li (1999).
4Apart from externalities, there are of course several further arguments in favor (economies of scale) and
against (information disadvantages) centralization. This suggest, that it is not immediate whether a centralization
is indeed warranted or not. For a discussion of this issue, which is beyond the scope of the present paper, compare
Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2005).
1borne by the regions, there arises a disincentive for tax enforcement.5;6 Hence, there is a tradeo®
between the internalization e®ect and the distortion from FE.
This paper contributes to the analysis of decentralized tax enforcement by exploring the
incentives from another feature of many federal countries: formula apportionment (FA). While
a growing amount of literature discusses the role of FA systems for pro¯t shifting and tax
competition,7 our focus is quite di®erent: We study decentralized tax enforcement under FA
and compare it to the equilibria which emerge under FE, as well as under a joint system of
¯scal equalization cum formula apportionment, as it is in place in Germany. We discuss the
di®erences between these institutions and show, under which conditions which regime provides
the `best' incentives for decentralized auditing in a federal country.
Our analysis extends the model from StÄ owhase and Traxler (2005) by incorporating the
choice of ¯rm as well as `headquarter' (HQ) locations, similar to Black and Hoyt (1989). In
addition to an endogenous evasion decision, the framework thereby captures the mobility of
production factors as well as the endogenous emergence of multiregional companies. Allowing
for two layers of mobility { mobility of capital and HQs { represents an innovative model
feature which turns out to be crucial for the evaluation of a FA system. Moreover, it re°ects
that regions not only compete for production plants but also for HQs { just recall the impact
of Boeing's announcement in 2001 that it will relocate its HQ from Seattle or compare one of
the many governmental information campaigns for potential investors. A webpage supported by
the Belgium Government, e.g., makes clear that `Belgium highly values the presence of corporate
headquarters and tends to actively pursue and attract them.'8
Studying a stylized form of apportionment, we show that the incentives which derive from
FA, crucially depend on the level of interregional company integration { a fact which has been
so far neglected in the literature. Under FA, the taxes from multiregional companies are shared
between jurisdictions according to a speci¯c formula (e.g. based upon the factor input in the
di®erent regions). As sub-national governments bear the full costs of enforcement, FA then
drives a wedge between the marginal costs and bene¯ts of tax collection, distorting the e®orts
put into tax enforcement. At the same time, however, FA reduces the incentive to compete
for multiregional companies, thereby working in favor of higher enforcement e®orts. Hence, FA
exerts opposing e®ects on decentralized tax enforcement, which are structurally similar to those
from FE.
Compared to the case without any interregional redistribution of tax revenues, a FA system
will result in more e®ective decentralized tax enforcement, if the level of interregional integration
5Compare Baretti et al. (2002), BÄ uttner (2006), Dahlby and Warren (2003), Snoddon (2003) for empirical
evidence on the (dis)incentives from FE.
6StÄ owhase and Traxler (2005) further show that a scheme which redistributes revenues net of enforcement costs
could in principle eliminate this disincentive. In practice, however, asymmetric information between di®erent
layers of government is likely to render such a mechanism infeasible.
7See, among many others, Eggert and Schjelderup (2003), Pethig and Wagener (2007), Riedel and Runkel
(2007).
8See http://invest.belgium.be/en/headquarters. Several cases where companies relocated their headquar-
ters are discussed e.g. in Klier and Testa (2002), Black and Hoyt (1989, p.1249). Compare also The Economist,
March 10 2007, p.68.
2of ¯rms is su±ciently low. Under the same conditions, however, a FE system might result in
weaker enforcement. This di®erence stems from the fact that under FA only the revenues from
multiregional companies are redistributed whereas under FE tax revenues from all companies
are shared. In an economy with few multiregional companies, the distortion from FA is thus
smaller than the one from FE. At the same time, however, the internalization e®ect from FA
only partially depends on the degree of interregional integration. Hence, with a su±ciently small
share of multiregional companies, the internalization will dominate the distortion under FA, but
not necessarily under FE.
A similar result is found in the analysis of a joint FA and FE scheme. Adding FA to an
existing FE system will improve the e®ectiveness of decentralized enforcement whenever inter-
regional integration is su±ciently small. As both apportionment and equalization have slightly
di®erent purposes beyond providing incentives for decentralized policy choice, this ¯nding is
important. It shows that, apart from an eventually infeasible replacement of one by the other,
the two systems can also be combined and still work as an attractive policy tool which provides
regions with incentives to exert viable tax collection e®orts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the basic
model. Section 3 discusses the decentralized choice of tax enforcement in the case without any
interregional redistribution of tax revenues. Thereafter, we analyze the impact from FA (Section
4), FE (section 5) and a joint system of FA and FE (section 6). Policy implications and avenues
for future research are discussed in the conclusion.
2 The Model
Our analysis extends the model of tax evasion within a federal economy from StÄ owhase and
Traxler (2005), allowing for a multiregional ¯rm structure. Firms consist of two parts: a place
of production and a `headquarter' (HQ). While the location of production { in the following
called the `home region' of a ¯rm { is exogenously given, the ¯rms can either maintain their HQ
at home or relocate it `abroad'. In addition, capital input { and therewith the level of production
{ is mobile between regions. Independent from the HQ location, ¯rms have to pay a unit tax on
capital inputs. Motivated by the situation in Germany, we consider the tax rate as exogenously
given and harmonized. The two parts of the ¯rm are treated as one taxable unit, where taxes
are collected at the HQs.9 This last assumption also shows that the model depicts sub- rather
then international ¯scal competition.
Firms may evade taxes, responding to the strictness of tax enforcement { expressed by the
likeliness of facing an audit. Audits only take place at the ¯rms' HQs and auditing rates may
di®er between regions. By choosing the location of their HQ, ¯rms can therefore determine
which regions' tax enforcement regime they will face.
The sequence of decisions is as follows: First, regions simultaneously choose (and credibly
commit to) an audit rate. Thereafter, ¯rms decide on their HQ location, capital inputs and the
9The production unit in our model is not a subsidiary company but only a dependent branch within a ¯rm.
3level of tax evasion. Finally, audits take place and taxes are collected. We now describe the
model's structure in more detail.
Federal Economy and Firm Structure. We consider an economy with two perfectly
symmetric regions. In each region a continuum of ¯rms with unit mass uses perfectly mobile
capital and a ¯xed, immobile factor to produce a homogenous private good. All ¯rms in the
economy use the same technology, characterized by a strictly concave production function f(ki`),
where ki` denotes the capital employed by a ¯rm with production in region i and a HQ in
` 2 fi;jg. In the following, the double subindexes ii respectively ij denote `regional' respectively
`multiregional' ¯rms, where the latter have their HQ abroad.
Firms can evade taxes by concealing a share ei` of the capital employed. Hiding inputs
from tax authorities is costly. Following Cremer and Gahvari (1993), we assume that the costs
are convex in ei` and linear in the tax base. Regional auditing policies are non-discriminatory,
i.e. the jurisdictions audit regional (`home') and multiregional (`foreign') ¯rms with the same
probability p`.10 In case of an audit, the evasion is detected and the ¯rm has to pay the full
taxes plus a ¯ne which is proportional to the taxes evaded. With probability 1¡p` the ¯rm gets
away with the evasion and only pays taxes on the declared amount of capital. The expected
pro¯t of a ¯rm is then given by
¼i` = f(ki`) ¡ rki` ¡ g(ei`)ki` ¡ p`(tki` + (s ¡ 1)tei` ki`) ¡ (1 ¡ p`)t(1 ¡ ei`)ki`
where r denotes the factor price for capital in the economy and the evasion costs are g(ei`)ki`
with g0 > 0 and g00 > 0. Note again that the tax (t) as well as the penalty rate (s > 1) are
harmonized for both regions, whereas the auditing probability p` is not. Simplifying yields
¼i` = f(ki`) ¡ (r + g(ei`) + ¿i`)ki` (1)
with ¿i` ´ t(1 ¡ ei` + ei`p`s), the expected or e®ective tax rate faced by a ¯rm with a HQ in
`. This points out a central property of this model: Despite a harmonized tax rate, regions can
determine the e®ective taxation by choosing their auditing rate p`.
Taking the auditing policy as given, risk neutral ¯rms choose ki` and ei` to maximize expected
pro¯ts from (1). Optimal choices are characterized by the ¯rst order conditions
g0(ei`) = (1 ¡ p`s)t, (2)
f0(ki`) = r + g(ei`) + ¿i`. (3)
Assuming p`s < 1, the optimal level of evasion is always positive. Several properties of this
10At this point, one could generalize the model in several aspects. First, we could consider an evasion technology
which accounts for the fact that multiregional ¯rms may face better opportunities { and hence lower costs { to
evade taxes. Furthermore, we could allow for a di®erent e®ectiveness (or costs) of auditing regional versus
multiregional ¯rms, resulting in a discriminatory audit policy. While the ¯rst extension would only quantitatively
a®ect the HQ location choice (see (5) below), the second one would change the structure our analysis: Although
the regions' strategic incentives to engage in ¯scal competition would remain the same, the regimes discussed in
sections 4 and 5 would have a di®erent impact on the choice of a discriminatory enforcement policy. A formal
analysis of a discriminatory policy choice is left for future research.
4framework derive from (2) and (3) (see Appendix A): First, ¯rms will conceal more if the
statutory tax rate increases or if the detection probability decreases { a standard result in the
literature on evasion by ¯rms (see e.g. Cremer and Gahvari, 1993). Second, an increase in the
audit rate will raise (per unit) capital costs and hence decrease capital demand. This triggers
an e®ect which is analogous to the impact of a tax increase on mobile capital in standard tax
competition models. Third, each ¯rm's optimal choice of capital input and tax evasion depends
only on the location of its HQ { and not on its home region. This is the case since it is only the
HQ location which determines the non-discriminatory auditing regime and thereby the e®ective
tax rate for the ¯rm. As ¯rms are assumed to be identical with respect to evasion and production
technologies, we get
¼i` = ¼j` = ¼`, ei` = ej` = e`, ki` = kj` = k`, ¿i` = ¿j` = ¿`. (4)
In the optimum, ¯rms with a HQ in ` will make the same pro¯ts, choose the same level of capital
inputs respectively concealed capital, and will face the same e®ective tax rate ¿`, irrespective of
their home region. In the remainder of the paper, a single subindex of ¿ will therefore denote
the e®ective tax rate in the region where a ¯rm has its HQ.
Headquarter Location. We now turn to the ¯rms' choice of the HQ location. A ¯rm from
region i compares the expected pro¯ts if it maintains its HQ at home with the alternative of
becoming a multiregional ¯rm by relocating the HQ into region j. This comparison is in°uenced
by the regions' e®ective tax rates (which are determined by the regional auditing policies) as
well as µ · µi · µ, some ¯rm-speci¯c net-bene¯ts (µ > 0) respectively net-costs (µ < 0) from
relocating the HQ abroad (compare Black and Hoyt, 1989). The parameter therefore captures
the ¯rms' costs from relocating the HQ as well as potential bene¯ts from positioning the HQ in
a di®erent region (e.g. close to an important market).11
A ¯rm from region i will maintain its HQ at home i® µ · ^ µi, with
^ µi ´ ¼ii ¡ ¼ij. (5)
The threshold equals the gains (or losses) from maintaining the HQ at home instead of going
abroad. All ¯rms with costs above (respectively bene¯ts below) this threshold will keep their
HQ in i, while those with µ > ^ µi will relocate it abroad.
Let the distribution of µ among ¯rms in both regions be given by the c.d.f. H(µ), where the
density function satis¯es 0 < h(µ) < 1 on the interval [µ;µ]. The share of ¯rms from region i
which maintain their HQ at home is then given by
¾i = H(^ µi), (6)
and the share of multiregional ¯rms equals 1 ¡ ¾i. One can interpret ¾i as an indicator for the
interregional integration of ¯rms, where a high [low] level of ¾i captures low [high] integration.
11See e.g. Klier and Testa (2002), Black and Hoyt (1989).
5Capital Market. In each region a representative household is endowed with a given amount
of capital ¹ ki (as well as one unit of the immobile factor). Hence, capital supply is exogenously




where ~ ki ´ ¾ikii + (1 ¡ ¾j)kji denotes the (true) tax base of region i. It is composed of the
capital from ¾i regional ¯rms as well as the capital from 1 ¡ ¾j multiregional (foreign) ¯rms,
which have relocated their HQs into i.12
3 Decentralized Tax Enforcement
We will now study the endogenous choice of auditing rates. As a benchmark scenario, we
¯rst analyze the case of decentralized tax enforcement without any interregional sharing of tax
revenues. Regional governments choose their enforcement e®orts, taking into account the impact
on tax evasion, the e®ective tax rate as well as the HQ and capital allocation. Authorities are
assumed to maximize net revenues, consisting of taxes and penalties collected minus auditing
costs. The costs, which are necessary to establish an auditing rate pi for a tax base ~ ki, are given
by c(pi;~ ki), with c1 ¸ 0, c11 ¸ 0, c2 ¸ 0, c22 ¸ 0 and c12 · 0.13 Regional net revenue can be
written as
Ri = ¿i~ ki ¡ c(pi;~ ki) (7)
with ¿i denoting the e®ective tax rate as de¯ned above. Taking the other region's auditing rate
as given, each authority then chooses pi in order to maximize Ri. The ¯rst order condition to















and @¿i=@pi > 0 respectively @~ ki=@pi < 0 are derived in Appendix A.14 Condition (8) char-
acterizes the regions' reaction functions which, in turn, determine the Nash equilibrium of the
decentralized policy choice.
Let us now compare the result from decentralized auditing with the outcome under a cen-
tralized system. Consider a central authority which chooses (regional) tax enforcement levels
in order to maximize total revenues max R ´
P
Ri. The revenue maximizing choice is then
12 Equivalently, we can de¯ne Ki ´ ¾ikii + (1 ¡ ¾i)kij, capturing the capital employed in the production
process of jurisdiction i. It is straightforward that there holds
P
Ki =
P~ ki in equilibrium. Ki consists of the
capital from ¾i regional ¯rms as well as from 1 ¡ ¾i multiregional (home) ¯rms, which have their HQ in j. This
shows that we treat the HQ as a `letterbox', which does not employ any capital. We will come back to this point
in the following.
13The subindexes here denote the derivative(s) of c(:;:) w.r.t. the ¯rst respectively second argument(s).
14It is straightforward to show that the second order condition to this problem holds under our assumptions on





= c1(pi;~ ki) (10)
(equivalently for both regions).15 Comparing this condition with (8), one can easily see the
di®erence between the coordinated and the uncoordinated policy choice. Under decentralized
tax enforcement both regions take into account the capital out°ows caused by stricter auditing,
which reduce the marginal bene¯ts from auditing. In contrast, a central authority considers that
capital out°ows from one region correspond to capital in°ows { and ceteris paribus higher tax
revenues { in the other jurisdiction. Stated di®erently, the central authority incorporates the
¯scal externalities associated with regional auditing policies. The marginal bene¯ts considered
in the centralized decision { and therewith the chosen auditing rates { are therefore higher.
Proposition 1 The decentralized policy choice results in auditing rates which are below the level
a central authority would implement.
Proof. See Appendix.
This result is analogous to the ¯ndings in Cremer and Gahvari (2000) and StÄ owhase and
Traxler (2005).16 The proposition corresponds to the standard case of an ine±ciently low taxa-
tion of mobile capital in the tax competition literature (Wilson, 1986; Zodrow and Mieszkowski,
1986). Although statutory tax rates are harmonized, regions use audit rates as strategic tools
to engage in ¯scal competition. Decentralized tax enforcement then results in an `ine±ciently'
low level of auditing, respectively an `ine±ciently' high level of tax evasion { ine±cient, from
the perspective of revenue maximization.
In the following, we study how this result changes once we introduce di®erent forms of tax
sharing into our analysis. Before we do so, let us remark that we can not interpret Proposition 1
as a clear-cut result in favor of a centralized auditing system. (The same remark applies to the
results derived in section 6.2 below.) Our framework is tailored to the analysis of a decentralized
policy choice under di®erent forms of interregional redistribution. A proper comparison of
centralized and decentralized tax enforcement calls for including several arguments (such as
economies of scale in auditing, information (dis)advantages, etc.) which are neglected here, as
they would blur the focus of our study.
4 Decentralized Enforcement under Apportionment
We now introduce a stylized form of formula apportionment (FA) into the model. We assume
that a share 0 < ® < 1 of tax revenues collected from multiregional ¯rms is transferred back into
the ¯rm's home region { i.e. from the region of the HQ into the region where production takes
place. While in practice the value of ® depends on a speci¯c apportionment formula (e.g. based
15Here we made use of @~ ki=@pi + @~ kj=@pi = 0 as well as (4) and the properties of a symmetric equilibrium:
pi = pj ) ¿i = ¿j and c2(pi;~ ki) = c2(pj;~ kj) where j denotes a region j 6= i.
16For c(p;k) with c22 = 0 StÄ owhase and Traxler (2005) discuss that this basic result generalizes for n ¸ 2
asymmetric regions.
7upon the payroll in the di®erent regions), we consider an exogenous level of apportionment.
Although this assumption is untypical, it is not crucial for our results. Note ¯rst, that all our
main ¯ndings are independent of the level of ®, as we do not allow for income e®ects. Second, in
contrast to most other studies of FA (e.g. Riedel and Runkel, 2007), multiregional ¯rms have no
incentive to shift pro¯ts or costs. This is due to the fact that statutory taxes are harmonized and
that e®ective taxation is determined exclusively by the HQ location. Instead of modeling HQs
as `letterboxes' (compare footnote 12) we could thus introduce an endogenous level of inputs
employed in HQs and base the apportionment formula upon e.g. the payroll or the inputs used
by the two units of multiregional ¯rms.17 Such an endogenous factor ® would not qualitatively
a®ect the strategic incentives for the regions, nor would the apportionment rule a®ect the factor
allocation within multiregional ¯rms.18
Under FA the net revenue of a region i becomes
RFA
i = ¾ikii¿i + ®(1 ¡ ¾i)kij¿j + (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¾j)kji¿i ¡ c(pi;~ ki) (11)
The ¯rst term on the RHS depicts the revenues collected from the fraction ¾i of regional ¯rms
from i. The transfers under FA are re°ected in the second and third term: The second term
captures the fraction ® of taxes collected from domestic multiregional ¯rms (from i with a HQ
in j), which are transferred back into region i. The third term indicates taxes paid by foreign
multiregional ¯rms (from j with a HQ in i). Since a share ® of these revenues is transferred to
the ¯rms' home region j, only the fraction 1 ¡ ® remains in i.
In the case of decentralized tax enforcement a regional planner now chooses pi which maxi-
mizes RFA
i . The ¯rst order condition to this problem is19
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From this condition one can identify several incentives which are embedded in the apportionment
system:
A. Distortion. The ¯rst term on the LHS of (12) shows that FA reduces the regions' marginal
bene¯ts from auditing. While a region i bears the full costs of auditing, it only receives a
fraction (1 ¡ ®) of the taxes enforced from foreign ¯rms. This distortion clearly provides
a disincentive for auditing.
B. Mitigation of k{Competition. The apportionment system reduces the incentives to engage
in the competition for mobile capital. Under FA, revenues from domestic ¯rms which
17One caveat is that our stylized modeling of FA does not capture a formula which is linked to a company's
sales in the di®erent regions (or to any other variable which is una®ected by the HQ location).
18Assume that the apportionment formula is based upon the capital allocation between the place of production
and the HQ. In this case { and allowing for di®erent evasion technologies at the two units { a variation in the
auditing rate could result in a disproportionate change in the level of capital concealed at the HQ respectively
at the production place. Thereby, the apportionment factor would change, i.e. ® would become a function of pi.
It is easy to show, that including ®(pi) in (11) below, does only quantitatively change the subsequent ¯rst order
condition in (12), as the term @®(pi)=@pi vanishes in a symmetric equilibrium between symmetric regions.
19Compare the Proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix. There we also show @¾i=@pi < 0.
8are taxed abroad are (partially) retrieved, whereas revenues from foreign multiregional
¯rms are (partially) transferred abroad. This induces regions to internalize { at least to
some extent { the ¯scal externalities from its auditing policies.20 The e®ect, captured by
condition (12)'s second term, therefore works in favor of higher auditing rates.
C. Mitigation of HQ{Competition. The third term on the LHS of (12) re°ects a similar e®ect:
FA reduces the revenue gains from attracting foreign HQs as well as the losses from loosing
domestic HQs. This internalization e®ect mitigates the incentives to compete for HQs and
thereby tends to increase auditing rates.
As compared to the benchmark case without any interregional redistribution of taxes, FA
exerts incentives to reduce (e®ect A) as well as incentives to intensify (e®ects B and C) auditing.
Hence, the overall impact of the apportionment system on the decentralized policy choice is in
general ambiguous. Comparing conditions (12) and (8) delivers the following result:
Proposition 2 Under FA, the decentralized policy choice results in auditing rates which are
below the level chosen in the absence of any tax sharing scheme i®
(i) ^ ¸i > 0 and ¾i < ^ ¹i.
The uncoordinated auditing rates under FA are above the level chosen in the absence of any tax
sharing i®
(ii) ^ ¸i > 0 and ¾i > ^ ¹i, or (iii) ^ ¸i < 0
with













The proposition de¯nes conditions under which the introduction of FA will either raise or
lower the intensity of decentralized tax enforcement. The crucial thresholds in these conditions
are ^ ¸i, which captures the sum of e®ects A and B discussed above, as well as ^ ¹i, which measures
the strength of e®ect C relative to ^ ¸i. If ^ ¸i < 0, FA provides an unambiguous incentive to
intensify auditing. This is the case whenever the marginal capital mobility, j@ki=@pij, is relatively
high and the impact of stricter auditing on the e®ective tax rate, @¿i=@pi, is relatively small.
For this scenario, there exists a strong incentive to compete for mobile capital. The mitigation
of capital competition (e®ect B) then has a strong impact on the choice of auditing rates and
dominates the distortion from FA (e®ect A), which is weaker for small @¿i=@pi.
If marginal capital out°ows are relatively small and the impact of auditing on e®ective
taxation is relatively high, we will get ^ ¸i > 0, i.e. the case where the distortion (A) dominates
the mitigation e®ect B. However, FA also alleviates the competition for mobile HQs (e®ect C
20Hence, the e®ect is similar { though not identical { to the internalization e®ects from revenue sharing discussed
in KÄ othenbÄ urger (2002) as well as in StÄ owhase and Traxler (2005).
9from above), thereby providing a further incentive to raise auditing rates. As long as ¾i > ^ ¹i,
this last e®ect is su±ciently strong to outbalance (together with B) the distortion.
The intuition behind the last condition is straightforward. On the one hand, FA has little
impact on a region's tax revenues for high levels of ¾i (when there are only few multiregional
¯rms). For a low degree of interregional integration the distortionary e®ect as well as the
competition mitigating e®ect B are both relatively weak.21 On the other hand, e®ect C crucially
depends on the marginal HQ-mobility but not on the absolute level of ¾i. The more sensitive
HQ locations react to an increase in auditing, the more important becomes the apportionment's
incentive to mitigate the HQ-competition. Stated more technically: the higher j@¾i=@pij, the
smaller ^ ¹i and the more likely condition ¾i > ^ ¹i will be met.
Following the same line of reasoning it is clear that for ¾i < ^ ¹i (and ^ ¸i > 0) FA tends to
further push auditing e®orts below the level chosen in the absence of any tax sharing. This
condition is more likely to be ful¯lled, if there are many multiregional ¯rms (¾i is low) or if
marginal HQ{mobility is small. Under these conditions, the mitigation e®ect C has only a
minor impact and the distortion from FA dominates.
Figure 1: Impact of the Apportionment System
A graphical illustration of the three di®erent cases from Proposition 2 is provided in Figure 1.
The graph shows ^ ¸i on the horizontal and ¾ as well as ^ ¹i on the vertical axis. As long as ^ ¸i < 0,
the introduction of a FA system will unambiguously result in higher auditing rates for the whole
range of ¾ 2 [0;1]. For ^ ¸i > 0, apportionment works in favor of higher auditing e®orts only if ¾ is
above the ^ ¹i-curve. In this case, the two mitigation e®ects B and C outbalances the disincentive
for auditing (A). If, however, ¾i < ^ ¹i, the distortion dominates. Note that an increase in ^ ¸i
captures that the distortion becomes stronger relative to e®ect B (e.g. if either capital mobility
21One can easily see from (12) that e®ect A as well as e®ect B are decreasing in ¾i.
10decreases or if the marginal impact of auditing on the e®ective tax rate increases). The higher
^ ¸i, the bigger the mitigation e®ect C must therefore be in order to outbalance the distortion.
This is re°ected by the threshold ^ ¹i which increases in ^ ¸i.
5 Decentralized Enforcement under Fiscal Equalization
We now turn to a di®erent form of interregional redistribution: ¯scal equalization (FE) in the
form of revenue sharing. Each region contributes a share 0 < ¯ < 1 of its gross revenues to the
equalization system and receives half of the total contributions. The costs of tax enforcement,
however, are still carried by the regions. Region i's net revenues then become
RFE






i ¡ c(pi;~ ki)
where RG

























Comparing (14) with the equivalent condition for the decentralized policy choice in a federal
economy without any tax sharing (section 3), we get the following result:
Proposition 3 Under FE, the decentralized policy choice results in auditing rates which are
below the level chosen in the absence of any tax sharing i®
(i) ^ ¸i > 0 and ^ ¹i > 1
2.
The uncoordinated auditing rates under revenue sharing are above the level chosen in the absence
of any tax sharing i®
(ii) ^ ¸i > 0 and ^ ¹i < 1
2, or (iii) ^ ¸i < 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
The overall impact from FE is similar { though, as we will show, not identical { to the one
from FA, studied in the previous section. On the one hand, FE distorts the regions' incentives
to enforce taxes as it reduces the marginal bene¯ts from auditing without a®ecting marginal
costs (¯rst term in (14), the counterpart to e®ect A from section 4). On the other hand, the
mechanism induces regions to partially internalize the externalities from auditing: it lowers
the costs from an out°ow of capital respectively HQs (second respectively third term in (14),
similar to e®ect B respectively C from above). As long as ^ ¸i < 0 (when the internalization
of spillovers from e®ect B dominates the distortion), FE provides an unambiguous incentive to
implement higher auditing rates as compared to the scenario without any interregional sharing
respectively apportionment of revenues. If ^ ¸i > 0 (when the distortion dominates e®ect B) the
11overall impact from FE depends on ^ ¹i, the strength of the internalization e®ect C relative to
^ ¸i, the sum from e®ect A and B. Whenever ^ ¹i < 1
2, the internalization e®ect C is su±ciently
strong to outbalance { together with B { the distortionary e®ect. In this case, FE still works
in favor of higher auditing rates. The opposite holds true for ^ ¹i > 1
2 (and ^ ¸i > 0). Here, the
competition mitigating e®ects are too weak to compensate the disincentives from FE.
Note that 1
2 in the conditions for case (i) and (ii) in Proposition 3 can be interpreted as the
marginal tax on a region's tax revenues, implicit in the equalization scheme. Under FE, regions
contribute a fraction ¯ of their revenues and get back ¯=n, with n denoting the number of
jurisdictions within the economy. Allowing for n > 2, the evaluation of (gross) revenue sharing
would thus depend on the number of jurisdictions, as the distortionary e®ect is increasing {
respectively the internalization is decreasing { in n (see Proposition 3 in StÄ owhase and Traxler,
2005). Since the impact from the number of jurisdictions on the incentives from tax revenue
sharing is well known (compare e.g. KÄ othenbÄ urger, 2002), we focus on the case n = 2.
Figure 2: Impact of Fiscal Equalization
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 3 graphically. The two areas where the introduction of FE
would either increase or decrease auditing rates are separated by the dashed line at ~ ¸i, with




corresponding to the level of ^ ¸i for which ^ ¹i = 1
2.22 For all ^ ¸i < ~ ¸i, capital as well as HQ-mobility
are su±ciently high, such that the alleviation of ¯scal competition outweighs the distortion from
revenue sharing. Contrarily, the disincentives dominate for ^ ¸i > ~ ¸i.
22Note that ~ ¸i > 0 follows from @¾i=@pi < 0, which is derived in (A.8) in the Appendix. (A.8) further implies
that there always exists a ¯nite value of ^ ¸i for which revenue sharing has a negative impact on auditing e®orts.
125.1 Qualitative Comparison of Apportionment and Fiscal Equalization
A comparison of ¯gures 1 and 2 respectively Propositions 2 and 3 shows that the impact of an
apportionment and an equalization scheme are qualitatively equivalent for ^ ¸i < 0. If ^ ¸i > 0,
however, the two schemes can work into di®erent directions: For all 0 · ¾i < ^ ¹i · 1
2 (illustrated
by the grey shaded area to the left of ~ ¸i in ¯gure 2), FA provides an incentive to reduce
enforcement e®orts, whereas FE would work in favor of more frequent auditing. The intuition
behind this discrepancy is straightforward: While the incentives embedded in an apportionment
system depend on the share of multiregional ¯rms, this level of interregional integration does
not play any role under FE. Whenever 0 < ^ ¸i < ~ ¸i, the two mitigation e®ects dominate the
distortion under FE { independently of ¾i. Under FA, however, the distortion can dominate for
su±ciently high levels of interregional integration (if ¾i < ^ ¹i).
The two di®erent forms of tax sharing also have qualitatively di®erent impacts for ^ ¸i > ~ ¸i
whenever 1
2 · ^ ¹i < ¾i · 1 (depicted by the second grey shaded area in ¯gure 2). In this
parameter range, capital as well as HQ-mobility are relatively low and the mitigation of ¯scal
competition has little impact. Under FE, the distortionary e®ect becomes dominant. Under FA,
however, the distortion will be small if there are su±ciently few multiregional ¯rms (¾i > ^ ¹i).
In this case, the two mitigation e®ects o®set the distortion. Hence, FE would result in lower
auditing e®orts, whereas FA would trigger higher auditing rates. We summarize these ¯ndings
in
Corollary 1 For ^ ¸i > 0 the qualitative impact of a FA system on decentralized tax enforcement
is di®erent to the impact of FE i® either 0 · ¾i < ^ ¹i · 1=2 or 1=2 · ^ ¹i < ¾i · 1.
5.2 Quantitative Comparison of Apportionment and Fiscal Equalization
Let us now ask, under which of the two regimes { FA or FE { the decentralized policy choice
will lead to stricter tax enforcement. The answer to this question is given by
Proposition 4 The decentralized policy choice under FA results in auditing rates which are
below the level chosen under FE i®
(i) ^ ¸i > 0 and ³i > ^ ¹i [³i < ^ ¹i], or
(ii) ^ ¸i < 0 and ³i < ^ ¹i [³i > ^ ¹i]





Otherwise, the uncoordinated auditing rates under FA are above or, for the special case ³i = ^ ¹i,
equal to the rates chosen under FE.
Proof. See Appendix.
13While the conditions of this proposition look slightly convoluted, they all derive from




(see the Proof of Proposition 4 for the derivation). If condition (16) is ful¯lled, the marginal
bene¯ts from auditing are higher under FE than under FA for any pi. Replacing FA by a FE
system would then trigger an increase in the auditing e®orts.
Condition (16) simply compares the incentives from the two forms of sharing taxes. In par-
ticular, it compares the di®erences in the weighting of ^ ¸i { the sum from the distortionary e®ect
(A) and the mitigation of capital competition (B) { as well as the weighting of the mitigation of
HQ-competition (e®ect C). To illustrate this, let us restrict to ® < ¯ and consider ¯rst scenario
(i) from the Proposition. In this scenario ^ ¸i > 0, i.e. the distortion from the redistribution of
tax revenues dominates the mitigation e®ect B (for both schemes). The second term on the LHS
of (16) is then unambiguously positive, re°ecting that the mitigation e®ect C is larger under
FE as ¯ > ® (remember that @¾i=@pi < 0). Hence, it is su±cient for (16) to be satis¯ed, if
the expression in the squared brackets is positive. Intuitively this is the case, whenever the
distortion from FA { captured by the term ®(1 ¡ ¾i) { is stronger than the one from FE. In
contrast to this su±cient condition, ³i > ^ ¹i represents the necessary (and su±cient) condition
for (16) to hold under this scenario.
To see the intuition behind this latter condition, remember two points: First, note that ^ ¹i
measures the degree of HQ-mobility (relative to ^ ¸i). The more sensitive the HQ location reacts
to changes in the auditing rates, the lower ^ ¹i (for ^ ¸i > 0), the easier it becomes for ³i > ^ ¹i
to hold. The reason behind this is that the mitigation e®ect C { which is larger under FE as
¯ > ® { then becomes stronger, and the di®erences in the weights FA respectively FE put on
^ ¸i are less crucial. Second, we know from our previous analysis that the distortion from FA
will increase with a higher degree of interregional ¯rm integration (a lower level of ¾i). This is
re°ected by @³i=@¾i < 0 (for ® < ¯), making ³i > ^ ¹i more likely to hold for lower values of ¾i.
Scenario (ii) from Proposition 4 captures the case where ^ ¸i < 0, i.e. where the mitigation
e®ect B dominates the distortion (for both schemes). It would then be su±cient for (16) to
hold, if the expression in the squared brackets is negative. This holds whenever the weight on
^ ¸i under FA is smaller than under FE. In contrast to before, a high weighting now results in
a stronger internalization e®ect, providing a more pronounced incentive to raise auditing rates.
This is also re°ected in the necessary (and su±cient) condition for this scenario, ³i < ^ ¹i, which
is just the reversal of the condition for scenario (i).
6 Joint System of Apportionment and Fiscal Equalization
Finally we discuss the interaction of FA and FE in a tax sharing scheme which combines both el-
ements of interregional redistribution. Motivated by the institutional arrangements in Germany,
we consider a mechanism where revenues after apportionment are shared, whereas the costs of
tax enforcement are still carried by the regions. A jurisdiction contributes a share 0 < ¯ < 1 of
14its gross revenues after apportionment, RGA
i ´ RFA
i +c(pi;~ ki), with RFA
i being de¯ned in (11).
Regional revenues net of enforcement costs are then given by
RFF
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2 + ®(1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ¾i) ¸ 0 and °2 ´ (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ ®) ¸ 0
capture the interaction of the incentives from FA and FE. A comparison with the decentralized
auditing choice studied in section 3 leads us to
Proposition 5 Under a joint system of FA and FE the decentralized policy choice results in
auditing rates which are below the level chosen in the absence of any tax sharing i®
(i) ^ ¸i > 0 and ±i < ^ ¹i.
The uncoordinated auditing rates will be above the level chosen in the absence of tax sharing i®
(ii) ^ ¸i > 0 and ±i > ^ ¹i, or (iii) ^ ¸i < 0,
with
±i ´
¯=2 + ¾i (1 ¡ ¯)®
¯ + (1 ¡ ¯)®
. (18)
Proof. See Appendix.
As the joint tax sharing scheme represents a linear combination of FA and FE, its incentives
are closely related to the respective isolated e®ects. Compared to an economy without any
redistribution of tax revenues, the joint scheme provides incentives for higher auditing rates as
long as ^ ¸i < 0. This is not surprising, as the impact from FA and FE are qualitatively identical
for this parameter range (compare Propositions 2 and 3).
More interesting is the case of ^ ¸i > 0. For this parameter range, the interplay of FA and FE
will result in stricter tax enforcement as compared to the benchmark scenario if ±i > ^ ¹i. The
opposite holds true for ±i < ^ ¹i. It is straightforward that the joint e®ects from FA and FE tend
to increase auditing rates, whenever FA and FE have the same e®ect.23
Remember that for ^ ¸i > 0 the distortive e®ect from tax sharing (e®ect A) is stronger than the
mitigation of capital competition (e®ect B). Since the apportionment element within the joint
scheme becomes less important with fewer multiregional ¯rms (compare Proposition 2), the net
23One can easily show that ¾i > ^ ¹i and 1=2 > ^ ¹i together are su±cient for ±i > ^ ¹i.
15distortion { the sum of e®ects A and B { is decreasing in ¾i. For a lower level of interregional
integration (high values of ¾i), the mitigation of HQ-competition (e®ect C) is therefore more
likely to outbalance the distortion, and tax sharing would work in favor of stricter auditing.
Formally, the condition ±i > ^ ¹i becomes less binding for high values of ¾i, since ±i is increasing
in ¾i.
What can we say about the impact of ® and ¯ on the incentive from the joint tax sharing
scheme? From Propositions 2 and 3 we know that the qualitative evaluation of the two isolated
regimes are independent of the apportionment factor ® and the level of equalization ¯ (as we
do not consider income e®ects). In contrast, the qualitative impact from the joint scheme does
depend on the level of ® and ¯. The reason behind this is that the two layers of interregional
redistribution may exert di®erent incentives on decentralized tax enforcement for ^ ¸i > 0 (see
Corollary 1).
For ¾i > 1
2, when the majority of ¯rms maintain their HQs in the home region, one can derive
from (18) that ±i is increasing in ® but decreasing in ¯.24 The intuition for this is the following:
On the one hand, a higher apportionment factor only modestly increases the distortion when
interregional ¯rm integration is low (compare °1 in (17)). The incentive from FA to mitigate the
HQ-competition (e®ect C), on the other hand, is una®ected by ¾i (compare °2 in (17)). Hence,
with ¾i > 1
2 a higher apportionment factor ® will cet.par. make it more likely that ±i > ^ ¹i holds,
i.e. that the mitigation of the competition for HQs (e®ect C) dominates the distortion.
An increase in the equalization factor ¯ has similar e®ects: (i) it raises the distortion, (ii) it
mitigates the competition for mobile HQs and (iii) it tends to reduce the distortion from FA.
While the ¯rst two e®ects are independent of ¾i, the third one { which works in favor of higher
auditing rates { is not (compare °1 and °2 in (17)). The more ¯rms retain their HQs at home,
the less distortive is FA and the less crucial is the third, positive e®ect from FE. For ¾i > 1
2 an
increase in ¯ will then lower ±i, making it cet.par. harder for condition ±i > ^ ¹i to be ful¯lled.
Following these arguments, it is clear that for a majority of multiregional ¯rms (¾i < 1
2),
±i is decreasing in ® but increasing in ¯. For this scenario, the distortion caused by FA is
relatively strong. The joint tax sharing scheme is then more likely to increase decentralized
auditing e®orts, the smaller the apportionment and the larger the equalization factor.25
6.1 Comparison of the Joint System and Fiscal Equalization
Under which conditions will the joint tax sharing scheme provide incentives for stricter auditing
as compared to a simple FE system? The answer to this question is given in
Proposition 6 The decentralized policy choice under a joint system of FA and FE results in
auditing rates which are below the level chosen under a simple FE system i®
24An extended appendix, which derives these (and further) results can be obtained from the author.
25Note that for the special case ¾i =
1
2 we get ±i =
1
2, independently of ® and ¯. The impact of the joint system
is therefore equivalent to the one of a simple FE scheme, studied in section 5. The intuition behind this is that
the two forms of tax sharing become equivalent if ¾i =
1
2. This can also be seen by substituting ¾i =
1
2 in (12)
and comparing it with (14).
16(i) ^ ¸i > 0 and ¾i < ^ ¹i.
The uncoordinated auditing rates in a joint system are above the level chosen under FA i®
(ii) ^ ¸i > 0 and ¾i > ^ ¹i or (iii) ^ ¸i < 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Introducing apportionment into a FE system has the same qualitative consequence on audit-
ing e®orts as the introduction of a pure FA system into an economy without any redistribution
of tax revenues (compare Proposition 2). The intuition for this result is simply that FA inter-
acts with FE in a linear way. The impact from a change in ® on our three main e®ects from
tax sharing { the distortionary e®ect (A), the mitigation of competition for mobile capital (B)
respectively mobile HQs (C) { is weighted by the same positive factor (1 ¡ ¯). Hence, FA has
the same qualitative consequences on decentralized tax enforcement, independently whether it
is introduced as the only or as an additional layer of interregional redistribution together with
FE. Whether or not it raises auditing rates solely depends on which e®ect { the distortion or
the internalization { dominates. (Compare section 4.)
6.2 Centralized Auditing Choice
We conclude our analysis by asking how the decentralized enforcement policy under a joint
system of FA and FE compares to the auditing level a central planer would establish. In our
analysis, tax sharing is neutral with respect to total revenues in the economy. Hence, the problem
of a central planer is equivalent to the one studied in section 3. Comparing the decentralized
outcome from (17) with the centralized solution characterized in (10) yields the following result:
Proposition 7 The decentralized policy choice under a joint system of FA and FE results in
auditing rates which are below the level a central planner would implement.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind the result is straightforward. Without any interregional redistribution,
the competition for the mobile tax base results in auditing rates which are below the revenue
maximizing levels. As tax sharing mitigates the ¯scal competition, it tends to raise auditing rates
and reduces the gap between the uncoordinated and the coordinated policy choice. Nevertheless,
a system of FA and FE introduces a (further) distortion { regions carry the full costs of auditing
but retain only a part of their collected revenues. While the distortionary e®ect does not
necessarily dominate (compare Proposition 5), it prevents regions from implementing audit
levels which are equal to (or even above) the ones chosen by a central authority.
Note, that the pure FA system studied in section 4 as well as the pure FE regime discussed
in section 5 are both special cases of the joint system. Therefore, the result from Proposition 7
carries over for these two forms of tax sharing:
Corollary 2 The decentralized policy choice under a pure FA system (¯ = 0) as well as under
a pure FE system (® = 0) results in auditing rates which are below the level a central planner
would implement.
177 Concluding Discussion
This paper compares the incentives from formula apportionment (FA) and ¯scal equalization
(FE) on decentralized tax enforcement. Sub-national governments use their enforcement policies
as strategic instruments to attract a mobile tax base. Within this context, both FA as well as
FE, work as Pigouvian subsidies and mitigate the ¯scal competition. At the same time, however,
both regimes also distort the choice of enforcement e®orts, as they redistribute tax revenues but
leave the full enforcement costs to the regions. The tradeo® between these two opposing e®ects
follows a similar, but in one aspect importantly di®erent pattern under FA as compared to FE.
We discuss under which conditions which regime results in more e®ective tax enforcement.
Our analysis highlights the role of the interregional ¯rm integration { i.e. the share of mul-
tiregional companies { for the assessment of FA. We show that, for a su±ciently low level of
interregional integration, FA will provide incentives for stricter tax enforcement, whereas a FE
system can work into the opposite direction. Under the same conditions, the introduction of FA
into an existing FE system would foster the e®ectiveness of tax enforcement. Hence, a FA cum
FE regime could in principle work as an attractive tool, not only to redistribute tax revenues and
counterbalance regional inequalities, but also to provide incentives for the decentralized choice
of enforcement policies. This represents an important result for countries where institutional or
political-economic constraints render a centralization of tax collection infeasible.
In order to provide a tractable and conclusive assessment of FA and FE, we employed several
simplifying assumptions. While this seems to limit the scope of our results, we shall stress
that the main properties of the di®erent regimes would similarly turn up in a more general
framework of n > 2 asymmetric regions. In such a general model, however, the main incentives
from FA and FE would be overlayed by other e®ects, some of which are already well studied
in the ¯scal competition literature. A nevertheless promising extension would be to study the
endogenous choice of enforcement and tax policies. It would be interesting to see whether a
welfare maximizing authority would counterbalance ine±ciently low enforcement measures by
higher statutory tax rates, thereby overly taxing those who fully comply with taxes.
Our framework may also serve as a benchmark for empirical research. Although some recent
empirical contributions study the incentives from equalization transfers on decentralized ¯scal
policies (BÄ uttner, 2006; Dahlby and Warren, 2003; Snoddon, 2003), the question of decentralized
tax enforcement as well as the incentives related to apportionment have not been tackled so far.
The only empirical work which considers an institutional setup similar to the one discussed here
is Baretti et al. (2002). However, they neither have access to data on regional enforcement
measures nor do they devote the necessary attention to the role of interregional ¯rm integration
{ a factor which, as this paper has highlighted, exerts a central role in a transfer system that
includes elements of apportionment. Future empirical evaluations of the incentives from any FA
(cum FE) regime should account for this factor.
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20Appendix A. Comparative Static Results
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where we assume that the ¯rst order e®ect dominates.





























Using (2) and (3) one can easily show that the expressions in both squared brackets must equal






ki < 0 (A.8)
which is strictly negative (and ¯nite) due to (A.4) and our assumption on h(:). Following the
same steps as above, it is easy to show @¾i=@pi = ¡@¾j=@pi.















where (A.3) and (A.8) imply that the whole term must be negative.
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Note that in a plausible equilibrium there must hold ¿i > c2 { otherwise a region could increase
its net revenues by reducing the tax base. As @~ ki=@pi < 0, the LHS in this condition is lower
than the LHS in (10) for any pi.
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as well as (4) and the fact that













holds in a symmetric equilibrium, we arrive after some rearranging at (12).













Since we consider symmetric equilibria between perfectly symmetric region together with an
exogenous capital supply, the equilibrium capital allocation will be the same across di®erent
scenarios. The RHS of the di®erent ¯rst order conditions will therefore be the same for any
pi, and we only have to consider the marginal bene¯ts from auditing. (This argument is also
applied in the following proofs.)
The comparison with condition (12) then shows, that the LHS in (A.12) is strictly larger














22Simplifying and rearranging we can rewrite this inequality as





if ^ ¸i > 0 (A.14)





if ^ ¸i < 0 (A.15)
Since @¾i=@pi < 0, the RHS of the inequality { which corresponds to ^ ¹i from (13) { is smaller
than unity as long as ^ ¸i < 0. Hence, for any pi the marginal bene¯ts of auditing in the case
without FA are higher [lower] as in the scenario with FA if (i) ^ ¸i < 0 and ¾i < ^ ¹i [(ii) if ^ ¸i < 0
and ¾i > ^ ¹i]. For the case with ^ ¸i < 0, the RHS of the inequality is strictly greater than one.
As ¾i 2 [0;1], the second condition can then never hold. Therefore, the marginal bene¯ts of
auditing without FA are always below the marginal bene¯ts under FA as long as (iii) ^ ¸i < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3 and 5. The ¯rst order condition to the regions' problem under the
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Rearranging and substituting for (4) and (A.11), we arrive at (17). Comparing the LHS of (17)
and (8), the former is strictly greater than the latter if




with °1 respectively °2 as de¯ned in the main text and °2 < 1. After some rearranging, we can
rewrite this condition as
±i > ^ ¹i if ^ ¸i > 0
±i < ^ ¹i if ^ ¸i < 0
(A.17)
with ±i as de¯ned in (18). From the Proof of Proposition 2 we know that ^ ¹i > 1 for ^ ¸i < 0
(assuming ^ ¸i 6= ¡1). Since 0 · ±i · 1, condition (A.17) is then always ful¯lled for ^ ¸i < 0. This
proves Proposition 5.
From this result immediately follows Proposition 3. First, note that ±i = 1
2 for ® = 0.
Condition (A.17) then simpli¯es to
1
2 > ^ ¹i if ^ ¸i > 0
1
2 < ^ ¹i if ^ ¸i < 0
(A.18)
which proves Proposition 3.
23Proof of Proposition 4. Comparing the LHS of condition (12) with the one in condition
(14), the latter is strictly smaller than the former if
^ ¸i
µ








Rearranging and substituting for ^ ¹i and ³i as de¯ned in the main text, we arrive at
³i ¸ ^ ¹i [³i · ^ ¹i] if ^ ¸i > 0 and ® < ¯ [® > ¯]
³i ¸ ^ ¹i [³i · ^ ¹i] if ^ ¸i < 0 and ® > ¯ [® < ¯]
(A.20)
where ® 6= ¯ has to hold. If the respective inequalities between ³i and ^ ¹i hold strictly, auditing
rates under FA will be below the levels chosen under FE. For the special case where ³i = ^ ¹i, the
two schemes lead to the same auditing rates. Otherwise, if the inequalities are violated, auditing
e®orts will be higher under FA than under a FE system.
Proof of Proposition 6. Comparing the LHS of condition (12) with the one in condition
(17), the latter is strictly greater than the former if




With ® > 0 and ¯ < 1 we can rewrite this inequality as
¾i > ^ ¹i if ^ ¸i > 0
¾i < ^ ¹i if ^ ¸i < 0 ,
(A.22)
where we have substituted for ^ ¹i. Remember that for ^ ¸i < 0 there holds ^ ¹i > 1. As ¾i 2 [0;1]
the inequality is always ful¯lled for ^ ¸i < 0.
Proof of Proposition 7. Substituting for C
0

























Note further, that the problem of a central authority under a joint system of FA and FE is
equivalent to the case without any interregional redistribution of revenues. The comparison of
the above condition with (10) then shows that { for any pi { the central authority considers







[¿i (1 ¡ 2°1) ¡ c2] + 2ki
@¾i
@pi
[¿i°b ¡ c2] < 0. (A.24)
For any reasonable equilibrium, the expressions in the squared brackets in the second and third
term on the LHS must be positive. Otherwise a region could increase net revenues by pushing out
capital respectively HQs from the economy. Since °1 ¸ 0, the LHS is unambiguously negative
and the condition is always ful¯lled.
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